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Abstract
We study the propagation of ﬁnancial crises between regions characterized by
moral hazard problems. The source of the problem is that banks are protected by
limited liability and may engage in excessive risk taking. The regions are aﬀected
by negatively correlated liquidity shocks, so that liquidity coinsurance is Pareto
improving. The moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are suﬃciently cap-
italized. Under autarky, a limited investment is needed to achieve optimality, so
that a limited amount of capital is suﬃcient to prevent risk-taking. With interbank
deposits the optimal investment increases, and capital becomes insuﬃcient to pre-
vent excessive risk-taking. Thus bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and
the crises spread to other regions via the ﬁnancial linkages. Opening the ﬁnancial
markets is nevertheless Pareto improving; consumers beneﬁt from liquidity coin-
surance, although they pay the cost of excessive risk-taking. Finally, we show that
in this framework a completely connected deposit structure is more conducive to
ﬁnancial crises than an incompletely connected structure.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is sometimes claimed that the opening of ﬁnancial markets may increase
the instability of ﬁnancial systems. In this paper we try to show that this
claim may be correct, but that it does not imply that the creation of ﬁnancial
linkages across countries should be restrained.
The main idea is the following. Consider a two-region economy where, in
each region, the banking sector has access to long-term investment opportu-
nities and consumers give their assets to the banks in order to exploit such
opportunities. The two regions have negatively correlated liquidity needs
so that there are gains from trade from pooling the ﬁnancial resources, for
example through an interbank deposit market.
Banks can choose between a safe long-term asset and a riskier asset
yielding a lower expected return (we will call this the ‘gambling asset’).
Investing in such risky assets may become attractive if the banks are pro-
tected by limited liability and are undercapitalized, since in that case the
bank is gambling with depositors’ money. The sub-optimal investment in
the excessively risky asset may be prevented if the banks are suﬃciently
capitalized.
Suppose now that, under autarky, depositors optimally choose a low level
of long-term investment. Then, under autarky, banks have enough capital
and the moral hazard problem does not appear. Suppose next that, when
ﬁnancial linkages are established, depositors want to substantially increase
the long-term investment; this will be the case if long—term investment be-
comes more attractive when liquidity coinsurance is present. At this point
the depositors face a trade oﬀ. If they allow the banks to increase substan-
tially the long—term investment then they will be undercapitalized, so that
they will gamble with depositors’ money. As an alternative they may restrict
the amount of long—term investment (making therefore sure that banks re-
main suﬃciently capitalized), thus giving up a substantial part of the gains
from the creation of ﬁnancial linkages. Provided that the gambling asset is
not too bad, the depositor will prefer to have undercapitalized banks. This
leads to a situation in which bankruptcy occurs with positive probability
(when the ‘gambling asset’ has low returns), and bankruptcy in one country
spreads to other countries.
Nevertheless, depositors are better oﬀ when ﬁnancial linkages are estab-
lished. The two regions can achieve a Pareto-superior allocation by exchang-
ing deposits in the interbank market, thus providing liquidity coinsurance.
This has to be traded oﬀ against the costs of greater exposure to ﬁnancial
crises. Notice that ﬁnancial links will be established only when the beneﬁts
2are greater than the costs, that is when the possibility of ﬁnancial crises is
limited. As a consequence, crises and ﬁnancial contagion are rare events.
Furthermore, it turns out that the probability of contagion is greater the
larger is the number of interbank deposit’s cross-holdings. Thus, contrary to
previous models, we ﬁnd that a market organization in which each region is
ﬁnancially linked only to another region is less conducive to contagion than
a market structure in which each region is ﬁnancially linked to all other
regions.
Various papers have analyzed contagion in the presence of ﬁnancial links
among banks. In particular, banks are connected to each other through in-
terbank deposit markets that are desirable ex-ante, but during a crisis the
failure of one institution can have direct negative payoﬀ eﬀects on the in-
stitutions to which it is linked (see Rochet and Tirole [13], Allen and Gale,
[2], Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripoint [1], Freixas, Parigi and Rochet [9]).
A common feature of these models is the reliance on some exogenous unex-
pected shock that causes a ﬁnancial crisis to spill over into other ﬁnancial
institutions. Other explanations for ﬁnancial contagion have looked at liq-
uidity constraints (Kodres and Pritsker [12]), wealth constraints (Kyle and
Xiong [11]), the incentive structure of ﬁnancial intermediaries (Schinasi and
Smith [14]), information asymmetry among investors (Kodres and Pritsker
[12], Chen [6], Calvo [4], Calvo and Mendoza [5]). These are not mutu-
ally exclusive approaches, but they all involve a certain incapability for the
agents to correctly anticipate future events.
Moreover, recent empirical papers suggest that the inter-bank linkage
channel may not be so important in spreading contagion as the theoretical
literature has assumed so far. Sheldon and Maurer [15] for Switzerland,
Furﬁne [10] for the US, Upper and Worms [16] for Germany, and Wells [17]
for the UK estimate the matrix of bilateral exposure among banks ﬁnding
little potential for failures resulting from interbank linkages. The present
paper can rationalize these empirical ﬁndings since it models contagion in
interbank deposit market as an endogenous phenomenon, where the risk of
contagion is undertaken only if it is negligible. If the decision to establish
ﬁnancial links through interbank deposits market is rationally taken into
account, it should not be surprising that in the data there is little evidence
for this kind of connection to spread ﬁnancial crises.
The rest paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and
characterizes optimal risk-sharing. Section 3 presents the decentralized solu-
tion when the regions are in autarky. In this framework we study the role of
bank capital, and its relation with moral hazard and aggregate uncertainty.
Section 4 analyzes the decentralized environment when the regions are al-
3lowed to interact, with and without the moral hazard problem, and shows
the conditions under which the establishment of ﬁnancial linkages leads to
increased instability. Section 5 contains the conclusions, and an appendix
contains the proofs.
2 The Model
There are three dates (t =0 ,1,2) and a single good, which serves as nu-
meraire. There are three types of assets. A liquid asset (the short asset)
that takes one unit of the good at date t and converts it into one unit of
the good at date t +1 . An illiquid asset (the safe asset)t h a tt a k e so n e
unit of the good at date 0 and transforms it into R>1 units of the good
at date 2. Finally, in order to model moral hazard, a second illiquid asset
is considered (the gambling asset) that takes one unit of the good at t =0
and transforms it either into λR units (λ>1) with probability η,o r0 units
with probability 1−η at date 2.W ea s s u m eηλ < 1,s ot h a tr i s k - a v e r s ea n d
risk-neutral agents strictly prefer the safe asset to the gambling asset. While
the short asset and the safe asset are always available, the opportunity of
investing in the gambling asset only appears with probability p.
We will assume that when the return on the gambling asset is λRx,o n l y
the portion Rx of the return is observable and can be used to pay the depos-
itors. The fraction (λ − 1)Rx is not observable and can be appropriated by
the bank owners; for example, this may be on-the-job perks or simply extra
money which is illegally diverted to other accounts. Banks are protected
by limited liability, so that when the return on the gambling asset is 0,t h e
depositors obtain zero at time 2. Thes assumptions implies that no contract
can be made contingent on the realization λR of the gambling asset.
There are two regions, labeled A and B. Each region contains a contin-
uum of ex-ante identical consumers—depositors with an endowment of one




u(c1) with probability ωi
u(c2) with probability (1 − ωi),
where the utility function u(·) is deﬁned over non-negative levels of con-
sumption, is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable, and satisﬁes Inada conditions. The probability ωi represents the




Table 1: Regional liquidity shocks
with ωH >ω L. There are two equally likely states, S1 and S2.T h e r e a l -
ization of the liquidity preference shocks is state-dependent, and is given in
Table 1.
Ex-ante, each region has the same probability of having a high liquidity
preference. All the uncertainty related to liquidity is resolved at t =1 ,w h e n
the state of nature is revealed and each consumer learns whether she is an
early or late consumer. Consumer’s type is private information. Notice that
if we consider the two regions as a single economy there is no aggregate
uncertainty, since the proportion of early consumers is γ ≡ 1
2ωL + 1
2ωH in
both states of the world.
Finally, in order to introduce bank capital we follow Allen and Gale [3]
and consider a second class of agents (called investors) with risk neutral
preferences. At each period t they are endowed with et units of the con-
sumption good, and we assume (e0,e 1,e 2)=( e,0,0). They either consume
or buy shares of the banks. If they become bank’s shareholders, they are
entitled to get dividends at t =1and t =2 .W ed e n o t eb ydt the dividends
paid to investors at time t, and assume the following utility function:
u(d0,d 1,d 2)=Rd0 + d1 + d2,
with dt ≥ 0 for t =0 ,1,2. The investors can obtain a utility of Re by
consuming immediately their endowment, so they have to be rewarded at
least R for each unit of consumption they give up today. If they buy the
shares of the banks for an amount e0 then d0 = e−e0, and they get dividends
d1 and d2 in the following periods. Overall, their utility is R(e − e0)+d1+d2.
Investors buy bank’s capital if the utility of doing so is higher than the
utility of immediate consumption, that is R(e − e0)+d1 + d2 ≥ Re. The
participation constraint of the investors can be written as
d1 + d2 ≥ Re0.
In this economy the Pareto eﬃcient allocation can be characterized as the
solution to the problem of a planner maximizing the expected utility of the
consumers. The planner overcomes the problem of asymmetric liquidity
needs of the two regions by pooling resources. Let y, x and z be the per
5capita amounts invested in the short, safe, and gambling assets, respectively.
Since the gambling asset is dominated by the safe asset, optimality requires




subject to the feasibility constraints:
x + y ≤ 1; γc1 ≤ y;( 1 − γ)c2 ≤ Rx;
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; c1 ≥ 0; c2 ≥ 0.
It is obvious that optimality requires that the feasibility constraints are















Since u is strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada conditions, the solution to
problem 1 is unique and interior. The optimal value y∗ ∈ (0,1) is obtained












and once y∗ has been determined by equation 2 we can use the feasibility









R, x∗ =1− y∗.( 3 )
Notice that (2) and (3) imply u0 (c∗
1)=Ru0 (c∗





1.T h u s , t h e ﬁrst-best allocation automatically
satisﬁes the incentive constraint c2 ≥ c1, that is late consumers have no
incentive to behave as early consumers. We will denote the ﬁrst-best alloca-
tion as δ∗ ≡ (y∗,x ∗,c ∗
1,c ∗
2),a n dU∗ the expected utility achieved under the
ﬁrst best allocation.
We remark here that in the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n ,t h ec a p i t a lo w n e db y
risk-neutral investors does not play a role. In fact, the allocation of risk-
neutral investors’ capital is indeterminate. They can give their money to
the banks (as bank capital) for investment in the safe asset or they can
consume their capital at time 0. This result is obtained because, when
we analyze the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n ,w ee ﬀectively rule out both aggregate
uncertainty and moral hazard. We will see that the amount of bank capital
plays an important role when either aggregate uncertainty or moral hazard
are present.
63 Decentralized Economies in Autarky
The ﬁrst best can be achieved only if the two regions pool their resources,
so that aggregate uncertainty is eliminated. We now want to study the allo-
cations that can be attained by a region in autarky, when there is aggregate
uncertainty and (possibly) moral hazard. The structure we consider is the
following:
• Banks can oﬀer fully contingent contracts, specifying the fraction of
each dollar of deposit to be invested in the short and safe assets re-
spectively and the amount that the depositor can withdraw at each












t is the amount that a depositor can withdraw at time t if the
value of the liquidity shock is ωs,w i t hs = L,H.
• The fraction x invested in the illiquid asset can be misused by the
bank owners and invested in the gambling asset; when this happens,
the bank will pay cs
t if the realization is λR,a n d0 otherwise.
In our model the moral hazard problem cannot be solved through contracts,
since outside parties cannot observe the investment choice of the bank or the
extra return that it produces. On the other hand, limited liability prevents
punishment when the return on the long-term investment turns out to be
zero. Therefore, the only way to provide incentives to the bank to choose
the safe asset is to require that the owners put enough of their capital in the
bank. We now analyze the form of the optimal contract in autarky, with
and without moral hazard.
3.1 Bank Capital and Aggregate Uncertainty
Call cs
t and ds
t the consumption of depositors and the dividend paid to
investors at time t,w i t ht =1 ,2,i ns t a t eωs,w i t hs = L,H.N o t i c et h a tw e
allow for the possibility to roll over deposits from t =1to t =2 .
The allocation in autarky with aggregate uncertainty is given by the





































1 ≤ y; s = L,H
(1 − ωs)cs
2 + ds
2 ≤ Rx +( y − ωscs
1 − ds

















y + x ≤ 1+e0; e0 ≥ 0; e0 ≤ e; ds
t ≥ 0; cs
t ≥ 0; s = L,H t =1 ,2.
The ﬁrst set of constraints says that the resources used at t =1to pay oﬀ
depositors and investors have to be less than the amount invested in the
s h o r ta s s e ti ne v e r ys t a t eo ft h ew o r l d .T h es e c o n ds e to fc o n s t r a i n t sl o o k s
at the second period. In this case the resources available are given by the
return on the investment in the safe asset Rx plus the resources rolled over
from period 1, if any. The third constraint is the investors’ participation










be the optimal allocation oﬀered to consumers under autarky when the
amount of capital available is e.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Proposition 1 There is a level of capital ea such that, for each e ≥ ea the






For values of e<e a the expected utility of the consumers is strictly increasing
in e, and it is constant for e ≥ ea.
The intuition for the result is as follows. First, dividends are paid only at
date 2, since this way the capital can be invested in the (more proﬁtable)
safe asset rather than in the short asset. Second, the risk neutral investor
only cares about the expected value of dividends. Thus, provided the non-
negativity constraint for dividends is not violated, dividends can be made
state-dependent in order to achieve identical consumption across states at
period 2. If there is enough capital we don’t have to worry about the non-
negativity constraints for dividends in the second period, so that equality of
consumption across states can be achieved when enough capital is present.
Notice that we have ruled out negative dividends and we have assumed
e1 =0 , so that no further injections of capital are possible at date 1. This
implies that consumption in period 1 cannot be smoothed out. The presence
of liquidity shocks that cannot be smoothed out implies that consumption in
8the ﬁrst period must be lower when the liquidity shock is high. In particular,
when the liquidity shock is high the consumers are entirely paid out the value
of the short asset, i.e. cH
1 =
y
ωH. When the shock is low, part of the short
asset is consumed immediately and part is rolled over to the next period.
The allocation δ (e) obviously gives a lower expected utility than the
ﬁrst-best allocation δ∗.W e w i l l c a l l U (e) the expected utility achievable









oﬀered when the capital is e ≥ ea.T h u sδa is the optimal contract when the
region is under autarky, there is no shortage of bank capital and there is no
moral hazard.
3.2 Bank Capital and Moral Hazard
The previous analysis assumed that the bank was willing to invest money
earmarked for long-term investment in the safe asset. Intuitively, this should
be the case when the amount of bank capital is large with respect to the
amount invested in the long-term asse t ,s i n c eb a n k ’ so w n e r sw i l lb em o r e
reluctant to gamble with their own money. In particular, we want to answer
the following question: If the consumers want a fraction x of deposits to be
invested in the safe long asset, what is the minimum amount of bank capital
needed to make sure that the bank will actually prefer the safe long asset
to the gambling asset?
When the bank capital is e and a fraction x of deposits is earmarked
for long term investment, the amount of money available for long term in-
vestment is x + e. The bank can split this amount between the safe asset
and the gambling asset. Let (b x,b z) be the amounts invested in the safe as-
set and the gambling asset respectively. Essentially, we want to ﬁnd the
minimum amount of capital e such that the optimal choice of the bank is
(b x, b z)=( x + e,0).
If the bank invests the whole amount x + e in the safe asset, the return
will be R(x + e) and the proﬁta ts t a t es = L,H is
ds
2 = R(x + e)+( y − ωscs
1) − (1 − ωs)cs
2.
On the other hand, if the bank puts the money in the gambling asset the
proﬁti ns t a t es depends on the realization of the gambling asset, and it is






λR(x + e)+( y − ωscs
1) − (1 − ωs)cs
2 with prob. η
0 with prob. (1 − η).
9The values of ds
2 have to satisfy the participation constraint for risk neutral
investors, and competition among investors will imply that the constraint is

















= η [λR(x + e) − Rx]
Therefore, the bank will choose the safe asset if
Re ≥ η [λR(x + e) − Rx].
Deﬁne
ξ ≡
η (λ − 1)
1 − ηλ
. (5)
We have proved the following result.
Proposition 2 If the deposit contract oﬀers a level of long-term investment
x then the bank will invest in the safe asset only if the bank capital is e ≥ ξx.
The value ξ is the lowest value of the ratio e/x such that the bank does not
have incentives to select the gambling asset. If a contract includes a value
of e and x such that e<ξ xthen it becomes common knowledge that the
bank will invest the money in the gambling asset whenever it is available.
Therefore, for a given level e of available capital, the investors have the
choice between a contract with an investment x such that e<ξ xin which
the bank will gamble or a contract with an investment x such that e ≥ ξx,
so that the bank will choose the safe asset.







































1 ≤ y; s = L,H
(1 − ωs)cs
2 + ds
2 ≤ Rx +( y − ωscs
1 − ds

















10y + x ≤ 1+e; x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; ds
t ≥ 0; cs
t ≥ 0; s = L,H; t =1 ,2.
Program (6) maximizes the expected utility of the consumer subject to the
constraint that the bank is willing to put the money earmarked for the
illiquid investment into the safe asset rather than the gambling asset. Let’s
call δng (e) the solution and Ung (e) the expected utility attained solving
program (6). The function Ung (e) is continuous in e.
Furthermore, let xa be the value of the long term investment in the con-
tract solving the optimization problem without moral hazard as deﬁned in
(4) when ea is the available capital (i.e., the capital that allows consump-
tion smoothing in the second period, as described in Proposition 1). Then





.I nf a c t ,i fe<e a then the
expected utility must be strictly increasing since more capital implies that
more risk sharing is possible, and if e<xa
ξ the expected utility is increasing
because more capital relaxes the moral hazard constraint.
Consider now the highest utility which can be achieved when the banks















































1 ≤ y; s = L,H
(1 − ωs)cs
2 + ds
2 ≤ Rx +( y − ωscs
1 − ds

















y + x ≤ 1+e; x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0; ds
t ≥ 0; cs
t ≥ 0; s = L,H; t =1 ,2.
Notice that in this case the consumption oﬀered at time 2 for every state of





2 with prob. (1 − p)+pη
0 with prob. p(1 − η).
where cs
2 is the solution to program (7). Also notice that the constraints
deﬁne a non-empty feasible set only if e ≤ ξx, that is only for low levels of
capital. We will call Ug (e) the expected utility obtained solving program
(7).
114 Liquidity Coinsurance and Moral Hazard
Absent moral hazard problems the ﬁrst-best allocation can be attained us-
ing an interbank market of deposits (Allen and Gale [2]). Since the two
regions have negatively correlated liquidity needs, banks belonging to the
two regions ﬁnd it useful to exchange deposits between themselves. When a
region turns out to have high liquidity needs then it liquidates the deposits
held in the other region, and it gives them back when the other region needs
them.
The ﬁrst-best allocation can be attained by a decentralized banking sys-
tem using interbank deposits as follows:
• each bank oﬀers the contract δ∗ =( y∗,x ∗,c ∗
1,c ∗
2) to the consumers and
the banks of the other region;
• each bank deposits (ωH − γ) cents in a bank belonging to another
region for each dollar deposited by consumers (and receives a deposit
of (ωH − γ) from a bank of the other region).
Under this arrangement, banks in the region hit by the high liquidity shock
(i.e. ωi = ωH) withdraw their deposits from the bank in the other region at
time 1, and at time 2 the funds move in the opposite direction. The interbank
deposits are used as coinsurance instrument against the liquidity shock1.
With perfect competition in the banking sector (and absent moral hazard),
the equilibrium outcome will be that banks oﬀer the contract yielding the
ﬁrst best allocation, thus maximizing consumers’ expected utility.
Also observe that, if there is no moral hazard and the interbank deposit
market is active, the level of bank capital does not play any role. All the
capital is invested in the safe asset and paid back to investors, without
aﬀecting the ﬁrst-best allocation for consumers.
Proposition 3 If there is no moral hazard problem and the two represen-
tative banks exchange an amount (ωH − γ) of deposits at t =0then the
ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o nδ∗ can be implemented by a decentralized banking system
oﬀering standard deposit contracts.
The interaction between the two regions eliminates aggregate uncertainty
and is able to implement the ﬁrst-best allocation. This makes the presence
1Since the liquidity shocks in the two regions are perfectly negatively correlated, the
insurance is perfect. Interbank deposits still play a role in smoothing out liquidity shocks
as long as the shocks are not perfectly correlated across regions.
12of bank capital not necessary, and its level would be indeterminate in both
regions. We now study what allocations can be achieved when moral hazard
is present.
4.1 Moral Hazard and Contagion
What happens if we allow for both liquidity coinsurance and moral hazard?
Consider ﬁrst the case in which the banks oﬀer the ﬁr s tb e s tc o n t r a c tδ∗.
Suppose, to ﬁx ideas, that a bank in region A invests the amount x∗ in the
gambling asset, rather than in the safe asset, while the banks in region B
invest in the safe asset. Then the following will happen.
1. If ωA = ωL then the bank pays ωLc∗
1 to the depositors of region A.
The bank of region B is hit by a high liquidity shock and it withdraws
the interbank deposits from region A. Total payment in region A is
therefore
ωLc∗
1 +( ωH − γ)c∗
1 = γc∗
1,
since ωL +ωH =2 γ. This is feasible since the investment in the short
asset is exactly y∗ = γc∗
1. In the second period region A has to pay
(1 − ωL)c∗
2 and it will receive (ωH − γ)c∗
2 from the bank of region B,
as well as the return from the long-term investment. If the bank in
region A invests in the gambling asset then the ﬁrm makes a strictly
positive proﬁt when the gamble succeeds and zero otherwise. Notice
however that in this case there is no contagion. When bank A fails
only the depositors of region A suﬀer. The late depositors of region A




2. If ωA = ωH then the bank of region A pays ωHc∗
1 to the depositors of
region A. Since its investmen ti nt h es h o r ta s s e ti so n l yγc∗
1,i tm a k e s
up for the diﬀerence by withdrawing (ωH − γ)c∗
1 from the interbank
deposits. In the second period, bank A has to pay (1 − ωH)c∗
2 to the
depositors of the region and (ωH − γ)c∗
2 to the bank of region B, for
a total of (1 − ωH)c∗
2 +( ωH − γ)c∗
2 =( 1− γ)c∗
2.I t x∗ was invested
in the safe asset then the bank breaks even, since Rx∗ =( 1− γ)c∗
2.
If the bank invests in the gambling asset, then it will be unable to
pay when the gamble fails, and it will make a proﬁt when the gamble
succeeds. In case of failure, the late consumers of region A receive 0.




2 instead of c∗
2. This follows from the fact that the
bank in region B has an amount Rx∗ =( 1− γ)c∗
2 available from its
13long-term investment; the claim for (ωH − γ)c∗
2 against the bank of
region A cannot be exercised since that bank is bankrupt, and the
resources have to divided among (1 − ωL) late depositors.
We can summarize the outcomes for the case in which the bank of region A
has incentives to gamble in the following way:
• With probability (1 − p)+pη either the gambling asset does not appear
or it appears and the gamble is successful. In the both cases the
depositors of both regions receive the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o na n dt h e
banks in region B make zero proﬁts. The bank in region A makes zero
proﬁts when the gambling asset does not appear and strictly positive
proﬁts otherwise.
• With probability p(1 − η) the gambling asset appears and the gam-
ble fails. In that case early depositors get their ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n .
Furthermore, in the second period bank A is bankrupt and




the late consumers in region B receive the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n .
T h eb a n ki nr e g i o nBb r e a k se v e n .
— If ωA = ωH the late consumers of region A receive 0 while the
late consumers in region B receive
1−γ
1−ωLc∗
2. The bank in region B
goes bankrupt.
The conditions under which banks in region Aare willing to invest in the
safe asset are exactly the same as before, i.e. an investment x in the safe
asset can be supported only of e ≥ ξx. The highest possible utility that can
be achieved is the one given by the ﬁrst best allocation δ∗ =( y∗,x ∗,c ∗
1,c ∗
2).
This allocation can be achieved through liquidity coinsurance between the
two regions provided that banks have no incentive to invest in the gambling
asset, i.e. e ≥ ξx∗ in both regions. We can therefore state the following
result.
Proposition 4 If e ≥ ξx∗ then the ﬁrst best is attainable.
When there is abundant capital moral hazard is not a problem and ﬁ-
nancial links between banks of the two regions do not increase the risk of
bankruptcy or contagion in any region. Things are diﬀerent when capital
is scarce. In this case we can prove that there are always values of the
parameters such that the depositors prefer the ‘gambling’ contract.
14Proposition 5 For each value e<ξ x ∗ there is a value pe > 0 such that if
p<p e the depositors in the two regions prefer to let the banks to invest in
the gambling asset.
The proof goes as follows. Let U∗ be the utility achieved under the ﬁrst
best contract, and b Ug (p) the utility achieved under liquidity coinsurance
when the bank are allowed to gamble. The function b Ug (p) is continuous and
decreasing in p,a n dlimp↓0 b Ug (p)=U∗. On the other hand, let b Ung (e) be
the expected utility when moral hazard is prevented. The function b Ung (e)
does not depend on p, and since e<ξ x ∗, the highest utility is achieved by
setting x = e
ξ.L e t
∆ = U∗ − b Ung (e),
and notice that ∆ > 0 and does not depend on p. But this implies that, for
p low enough b Ug (p) >U ∗ − ∆ = b Ung (e), so that gambling is preferred.
Proposition 5 implies that, provided bank capital is less than ξx∗,t h e
depositors prefer to bear the burden of ﬁnancial instability rather than re-
stricting long-term investment. This, of course, provided that the burden of
ﬁnancial instability is limited, that is p is low. This implies that, if ﬁnancial
instability is accepted as a consequence of the opening of ﬁnancial markets,
it must be the case that instability is a rare event.
In order to complete the argument and establish a link between the
opening of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial instability, we should show that
there are values of the parameters for which depositors prefer to prevent
investment in the gambling asset under autarky, but allow it when ﬁnancial
markets open. This happens if the opening of the markets, by bringing new
opportunities for coinsurance, increases substantially the utility of long-term
investment. As a consequence, depositors will want to increase the long-term
investment beyond the level e
ξ, thus accepting that banks will gamble. On
the other hand, under autarky the desired level of long-term investment is
smaller, so the depositors prefer to invest less than e
ξ and avoid gambling.
We ﬁrst establish conditions under which the long-term investment is
higher when the regions exchange deposits than in autarky.
Proposition 6 If R is suﬃciently close to 1 and e>e athen xa <x ∗.
The simplest way to grasp the intuition for Proposition 6 is to consider
the case R =1 . When capital is abundant, under autarky the optimal
allocation will allow for an investment ya i nt h es h o r ta s s e tw h i c hi se n t i r e l y
consumed when the liquidity shock is high, while deposits are partially rolled
15over when the liquidity shock is low2.I fR =1then it is optimal to consume
the same amount in each state of the world and period, i.e. cs
t =1 .T h i s
requires setting ya = ωH,s ot h a tcH
1 =
ya




1−ωH =1 . When the liquidity shock is low, individual consumption
is cL
1 =1 , and aggregate consumption is ωLcL




1−ωL =1 , obtained by rolling over an amount
ya − ωL = ωH − ωL to the second period.
The ﬁrst best policy when coinsurance is allowed also sets cs
t =1in each
period and state, but now the investment in the short asset necessary to
achieve this allocation is y∗ = γ<ω H = ya.T h u s , f o r R =1we have
y∗ <y a, and consequently x∗ >x a. Under autarky, we need a higher level
of investment in the short asset to guarantee enough consumption in the
ωH state. When R is slightly above 1, the same intuition will apply. The
diﬀerence is now that consumption in period 1 becomes more costly, since
the return on the short asset is inferior to the return on the safe asset, and in
particular it becomes costly to sustain consumption when the liquidity shock
is high. Thus, the optimal allocation requires cH
1 <c L
1.W eh a v et h e r e f o r e
two forces moving in opposite directions. On one hand, autarky requires
investing more in the short asset in order to ensure enough consumption in
state ωH. On the other hand, for R>1 optimality requires to curb cH
1 and
therefore the investment in the short asset. When R =1only the ﬁrst eﬀect
is present, so we have unambiguously ya >y ∗, but more in general when R
is suﬃciently close to 1 the ﬁrst eﬀect will dominate over the second.
When xa <x ∗ and ea = ξxa, so that the optimal banking contract pre-
vents moral hazard under autarky, then the opening of the markets leads
to better coinsurance of liquidity needs and a positive probability of bank-
ruptcy whenever p is suﬃciently close to zero.
Proposition 7 Suppose xa <x ∗, e ∈ [max{ξxa,e a},ξx ∗) and p<p e.
Then the two regions invest in the safe asset under autarky and in the gam-
bling asset when interbank deposits are possible. Under the optimal allocation
there is a strictly positive probability of bankruptcy and contagion.
When e ≥ ea each region selects the allocation δa,a n de ≥ ξxa implies that
banks prefer to invest in the safe asset rather than in the gambling asset.
Thus, under autarky there is no bankruptcy.
2When R =1the optimal policy is not unique. Any investment y ≥ ωH will sustain
the optimal consumption. However, for R>1 the optimal policy is unique, and the policy
we describe is the limit as R goes to one of the optimal policy.
16When ﬁnancial linkages are established, coinsurance against liquidity
shocks becomes possible. The condition xa <x ∗ implies that, absent moral
hazard problems, the depositors in the two countries would like to increase
the investment in the long-term asset. In other words, the possibility of coin-
surance makes long—term investment more valuable. However, since e<ξ x ∗
the capital available is not suﬃcient to prevent investment in the gambling
asset by the banks. The depositors have therefore to choose between curb-
ing the long-term investment to e
ξ or increase it and accept that ﬁrms will
gamble whenever possible. When the probability that the gambling asset
will appear is suﬃciently small, the second alternative is more attractive.
It is interesting to analyze exactly what is the probability of bankruptcy
and contagion when the situation described in Proposition 7. Under the
optimal contract each bank will invest an amount yg in the short asset and
aq u a n t i t yxg =1− yg in the long-term asset. Furthermore, each bank
deposits an amount ωH − γ in the other region.
A region goes bankrupt in two cases. First, and obviously, when the
gambling asset appears and the gamble fails, and event having probability
(1 − η)p. Second, when the bank has enough money from the long-term
investment (either because the gambling asset did not appear or because
the gamble was successful) but in the second period the other region is
unable to pay the interbank deposits. This is the case of contagion, since
the inability to pay by the bank in region A is only due to the bankruptcy
of the banks in region B. In general, a bank in region A is owed money from
the bank of the region B when the liquidity shock of region A was high, i.e.
ωA = ωH. This has probability 1
2. On the other hand, the probability that
the bank in region B is bankrupt is (1 − η)p. Thus, contagion from region
B to region A occurs with probability 1
2p(1 − η)[1− p(1 − η)],w h e r et h e
last term is the probability that bank A is solvent.
In our model contagion is a rare phenomenon due to the existence of
t h ei n t e r b a n kd e p o s i tm a r k e t s . I ti sr a r eb e c a u s eo n l yi ft h ep r o b a b i l i t y
of bankruptcy is low it is optimal to create ﬁnancial linkages and invest
in the long-term asset. The basic idea is that the possibility of coinsurance
obtained by creating ﬁnancial linkages increases the optimal amount of long—
term investment. When bank capital is low, depositors optimally accept to
let the banks gamble with the long-term investment, since it would be too
costly to curb long—term investment at a level that prevents moral hazard.
17A B
D C
A completely connected market
A B
D C
An incompletely connected market
Figure 1: Diﬀerent structures of the interbank deposit market.
A B C D
S1 ωH ωL ωH ωL
S2 ωL ωH ωL ωH
Table 2: Regional liquidity shocks with multiple regions
4.2 Multiple Regions
S of a rw eh a v ea s s u m e dat w or e g i o neconomy. In such economy contagion
occurs when the bank with the high liquidity shock in the ﬁrst period faces
a bank with a low return on the gambling asset.
Allowing for multiple regions does not change this basic transmission
channel of contagion. However, with multiple regions we can analyze what
structure of interbank deposit market is more resistant to contagion.
The current consensus in the literature seems to be that the more con-
nected are the interbank deposit markets the better it is for the resilience
of the banking system. The interbank deposit market turns out to be more
vulnerable to contagion when the claim structure is less connected (Allen
and Gale, [2]; Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, [9]). We show that in our model
this is not necessarily true.
Assume there are 4 regions (called A, B, C, and D). There are two
equally likely state of nature S1 and S2 and the realization of the liquidity
preference shocks in each region is state dependent, as reported in Table
2. Again, notice that when all regions are pooled there is no aggregate
uncertainty.
18As in Allen and Gale [2] we consider two interbank deposit market struc-
tures. In the completely connected structure each region receives deposits
from and makes deposits to all other regions. In the incompletely connected
structure, each region has relations only with the ‘neighbors’ (see Figure 1).
Absent agency problems, to overcome the problem of uncertain liquidity
need, and to reach ﬁrst-best, the amount of deposits exchanged between
each region is higher in the incompletely connected interbank deposit mar-
ket (exactly equal to ωH − γ) than what is needed in the fully connected
interbank deposit market (i.e., 1
2 (ωH − γ)). This implies that, in the for-
mer structure, contagion is more likely since a larger amount of deposit is
exchanged between each region (see Allen and Gale [2]). However this con-
clusion is not necessarily true when the possibility of contagion is optimally
allowed as a response to a moral hazard problem.
In our model contagion occurs when an otherwise solvent bank is unable
to retrieve its deposits from another bank. Suppose for example that the
state is S2, so that region B and D have a high liquidity shock at period 1.
Suppose further that the only region in which the gambling asset appears
is A, and the gamble fails. Region A is then bankrupt and, if the interbank
deposit markets are incompletely connected, the crisis spills over to region
Da tt =2(as in the two region economy). The contagious failures will stop,
since region C has positively correlated liquidity needs with region A, and
so will not withdraw at t =2from the failed region D. In this case, region B,
which has negatively correlated liquidity needs with region A, is not aﬀected
by the bankruptcy of region A. On the other hand, if the interbank deposit
market is fully connected the failure of region A will be contagious for regions
D and B (those with negatively correlated liquidity needs with region A)
since now both regions withdraw from the bankrupt region at t =2 .
Even if banks exchange less deposits in the fully connected interbank de-
posit market, region A’s bankruptcy spills over regions D and B since they
were counting on region’s A deposits to deliver the promised consumption in
t =2 . The probability of contagion therefore increases. On the other hand,
the extent of the amount of the default in the regions aﬀected by contagion
is smaller. With the incomplete structure, the only region aﬀected by con-
tagion is D, and that region is unable to pay the second-period consumption
for an amount (ωH − γ)c2. With the complete structure, both B and D are
aﬀected by contagion, but their loss is only
(ωH−γ)
2 c2.
There is almost no empirical work on the relation between the structure
of the interbank deposit market and the probability of contagion. As far as
we know, the paper by Degryse and Nguyen (2004) is the only exception.
19They ﬁnd that, in the Belgium banking system, a change from a completely
connected structure (where all banks have symmetric links) towards an in-
complete structure (where money centers are symmetrically linked to some
banks, which are themselves not linked together) have decreased the risk
and impact of contagion. This ﬁnding appears to be in accordance with our
theoretical results. However, it is clear that more evidence is needed to shed
light on this issue.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we show that ﬁnancial contagion may arise as a phenomenon
in the due course of the working of a market economy, without relying on
unexpected contingencies or exogenous shocks. We consider an economy
with two regions characterized by negatively correlated liquidity needs. In
the presence of aggregate uncertainty and absent agency problems, the two
regions can achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation by pooling their assets by means
of an interbank deposit market, thus creating ﬁnancial links between the two
regions.
The insurance provided by the interbank deposit market has to be traded
oﬀ against the costs of possible imprudent investments made by banks. The
opening of ﬁnancial markets, while leading to an increase of the expected
social welfare, may also increase ﬁnancial instability, which is rationally
taken into account by forward looking agents. From a positive point of
view, the model predicts the quite robust empirical ﬁnding that ﬁnancial
contagion is rarely transmitted through interbank deposit markets.
20Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .We start observing that we can restrict attention,
without loss of generality, to policies paying no dividends at time 1. Suppose
that an optimal policy requires ds
1 > 0 for some s. Consider a new policy
in which all variables are unchanged except that b ds




This policy is feasible and yields the same expected utility for all agents.
Furthermore, we can restrict attention to policies in which the whole capital
e is invested. If only e0 <eis invested then we can increase the capital
to e and the dividends at time 2 by R(e − e0) in each state of the world,
leaving all other variables unchanged. The policy yields the same utility and
satisﬁes all the constraints.
Any optimal policy must be such that x =1+e − y,w i t hy ∈ [0,1] (it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a ty ≤ 1, because otherwise the participation constraint
for the risk—neutral investors would be impossible to satisfy) and the resource
constraint of the second period has to hold with equality at each state of
the world. We can therefore write
ds
2 = R(1 + e − y)+( y − ωscs
1) − (1 − ωs)cs
2,s = L,H.
Thus, the participation constraint for the risk-neutral investors can be writ-
ten as

















If e is suﬃciently large, then the positivity constraints on ds
2 will not bind.




























1 ≤ y; s = L,H

















y ≤ 1; y ≥ 0; cs
t ≥ 0; s = H,L; t =1 ,2.
21Since u satisﬁes the Inada condition the optimal y will be interior, and
cs
t > 0 for each t,s. Also, optimality requires ωHcH
1 = y. The Lagrangian
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Conditions (9) e (11) imply cL
2 = cH
2 ; conditions (10) e (11) imply cL
1 ≤ cL
2.



























which again implies cH
1 <c L
1.
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− φL (R − 1) − φH (R − 1) = 0;
cH







− φH =0 ;
cL










− φL =0 ;
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− φL =0 .
If either φH or φL are strictly positive that by increasing e we strictly increase
utility.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .In a competitive equilibrium the deposit contract
oﬀered by the representative banks maximizes the ex ante expected utility
of the consumers. All we need to show is that the constraints faced by the
representative banks, with the help of the interbank deposit market, are the
same as the constraints faced by the social planner both in t =1and t =2 .
The region with high liquidity shock has the following budget constraints
in t =1and t =2 :
ωHc1 ≤ y +( ωH − γ)c1,
and
(1 − ωH)c2 +( ωH − γ)c2 ≤ Rx.
Both constraints are the same of the social planner problem. The region
with low liquidity shock has the following budget constraints in t =1and
t =2 :
ωLc1 +( ωH − γ)c1 ≤ y,
and
(1 − ωL)c2 ≤ Rx +( ωH − γ)c2.
Since ωH − γ = γ − ωL, also this region oﬀer ﬁrst-best allocation since the
constraints are the same of the social planner.













Consider now the determination of ya, the short term investment under
autarky when there is enough capital to make sure that consumption is




are rolled to the second period when the liquidity shock is ωL)s ot h a tµ =0
















The LHS of 12 is lower than the LHS of 13. If R =1then the RHS of 12 is
higher than the RHS of 13. It follows ya >y ∗ (in fact, when R =1it is easy
to see that the solution is ya = ωH >γ= y∗). Since the solutions ya (R)
and y∗ (R) are continuous in R, the inequality still holds for R suﬃciently
close to 1.
Consider now the case µ>0,s ot h a tcL
1 =
y



















= Ru0 (c2). (14)
Thus, this solution can never arise when R =1 , since the LHS of the equation
would be strictly higher than the RHS.
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